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AbstrAct
Drawing on both Agnes Heller’s paper “Where Are we at Home?” and 
Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology, this article discusses the meaning of the 
home metaphor as applied to the realm of politics. It examines particularly 
whether or not liberal democracy can be considered a home. In principle, the 
article argues that the home metaphor is a better image to think premodern, 
conservative and communitarian politics. Yet its usage in a liberal context at-
tests to some of the profoundest human anxieties.
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The title of this paper refers to a 1995 article written by Agnes Heller 
entitled “Where Are we at Home?”. I am going to consider what the home 
metaphor could signify if applied to the area of politics and discuss the doubts 
that arise when doing so. They are the doubts of a reader of Blumenberg, of 
somebody who considers rhetoric, metaphorology and the problem of non-
conceptuality of great importance.
Above all, Heller’s passionate article, in which she distinguishes different 
kinds of “homes”, has led me to ask myself many questions related to politics 
which I would like to share: is a liberal democracy a home; does it even make 
sense to think of a liberal democracy as a home; and, wouldn’t this metaphor 
be more suitable to think about communitarian regimes, or to think about con-
servative or traditionalist attitudes? At first glance this may not be the most 
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appropriate metaphor to understand modern politics, much less liberalism or 
liberal democracy. However, if it is employed in a liberal context, does it not 
respond to some of our deepest anxieties as human beings? This is what I 
would like to discuss in the following pages.
MetAphorology And the hoMe spAce
Asking if we are at home in a liberal democracy, or if any political com-
munity could be our home, is mere rhetoric if we fail to understand the com-
plexity of the metaphor and interpret the question as a mere investigation into 
the quality of the political system. On the contrary, I believe that in the cited 
article Heller employs “home” in a way that is in line with what Blumen-
berg denominates the absolute metaphor. This concept is related to absolute 
horizons –the world, life, consciousness– that cannot be encompassed or de-
fined by our experience (Blumenberg 1979, 80). Metaphors are sometimes a 
provisional formulation, an outline or intuition that aspires to be defined and 
conceptualised later. They can also be, as the author of Paradigmen zu einer 
Metaphorologie explain, “remnants, rudiments in the path from mythos to 
logos” (Blumenberg 1998, 10). In this sense, metaphorology is at the service 
of the history of concepts, although this is not the case that we are examin-
ing. Translating the home metaphor into a concept is problematic because it 
is the type of metaphor that structures the universe (the universe as a city, the 
legibility of the world, etc.) while representing a vast reality that can never be 
understood through experience and yet cannot be ignored. Such metaphors 
are the only ones that allow us to consider the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and 
elevate philosophy to the level of imprecision characteristic of our own expe-
riences (Monod 2007, 45-51).
According to Heller, the home is one of the few constants of the human 
condition, and therefore it is essential to the understanding of our culture. 
Our cultural products, from myth to contemporary science, work to suppress 
the estrangement and fear caused by a universe that, prior to the work, was 
characterised by arbitrariness or contingency and provoked insecurity, which 
Blumenberg noted was typical of the absolutism of reality. To state it with the 
assistance of the absolute metaphor, culture converts the world into our home.
But now I would like to discuss the complexity, ambiguity and ambiva-
lence of absolute metaphors because, like myths, they can be subject to con-
tradictory interpretations. This occurs with the home metaphor. On the one 
hand, it alludes to our need for security, for refuge, and this implies that its 
meaning depends on its opposite, the outside, of something perceived as a 
threat. However, home can also be used as a pretext by the enemies of free-
dom. Although the inside implicit in the home is usually associated with se-
133Are We at Home in a Liberal Democracy?
Res Publica: Revista de Filosofía Política, 27 (2012), 131-141  ISSN: 1576-4184
curity, it can also be related to confinement, a prison; and while the outside 
can be considered threatening and dangerous, it can also be identified with 
freedom. Of course, the question in the title of this text refers to the positive 
aspect.
According to Heller, familiarity –and remember that the absolute meta-
phor gives us access to realities that, like the lifeworld, resist conceptuali-
sation– is the most decisive constituent of the feeling of “being-at-home”. 
Philosophy sustains that sensual experience linked to a known, familiar place, 
a spatial home-experience, cannot be transferred to temporal home-experi-
ence. Language –particularly the mother tongue– and customs (mores) are the 
elements most closely tied to familiarity and to a specific space. In this way 
it is understood that the opposite of the comforting feeling of being at home 
(Heim, in German), is unheimlich, literally ‘un-home-ly’ but generally trans-
lated as “uncanny”, a concept examined in Freud’s famous article.
If this is the case, is it possible to think of this metaphor without also con-
sidering that the feeling of familiarity comes from something as particular as 
the family, and that home inevitably has a conservative dimension because 
it is linked to tradition and to that second nature which grows from customs 
deeply rooted in shared ground? From this perspective, the metaphor would 
seem more suitable to affirm pre-modern politics, a political philosophy based 
on the heterogeneity of the elements gathered in that extended home known 
as a respublica. If family, the most natural of homes, cannot be understood 
without hierarchy, without at least the qualitative difference between parents 
and children (although the differences in families of the past were starker), 
how can a democracy, the space of whoever, of equals, be considered a home 
akin to that of the traditional family?
When restricted to the sphere of politics the home metaphor inevitably 
leads us to the pre-modern era, in which the principal political metaphors 
were organic. Now then, this entire cultural universe is very far from the po-
litical philosophy of Agnes Heller. Her theory of radical needs clashes with 
the meaning of the home metaphor, with its link to the natural differences that 
occur within the family. Heller tells us that qualitative radical needs drive 
people toward ideas and practices that abolish subordination and hierarchy 
(see Heller 1993). Radical movements, those centred and organised around 
these needs, represent a minority, but at the same time they respond to values 
and needs shared by all humanity (Heller 1985, 296), which is not incompat-
ible with the fact that radical needs are plural. For Heller, what is important is 
that all radical movements exclude from their preferred system of needs those 
which oppress or defend the use of an individual as a mere tool for another. 
It is clear that when such needs cannot be satisfied by societies based on sub-
ordination and hierarchy they appeal to a radical democracy. In this case, not 
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only does the home metaphor seem inadequate, but we cannot even be sure 
that the liberal regime can satisfy the demands of a radical democracy.
Even if we adhere to the strict idea of the political metaphor, concerned 
with what is the best system for us, some doubt remains as to whether lib-
eral democracy can be our home from the perspective of radical needs. 
Especially if we take into consideration that politics in contemporary states 
is unthinkable without the hierarchy –and not only in a political or formal 
sense– that the concept of representation inevitably introdu ces, or, to put 
it another way, that introduces the inevitable absence of the people in gov-
ernment institutions. I believe that Heller notes this danger when she fears 
individuals and institutions that are capable of manipulating the people and 
attributing to them needs of which they are not even aware (Heller 1985, 
294). It would be very difficult for a radical democracy to survive institu-
tions in which only an elite –whether composed of clergy, intellectuals, 
sociologists or political representatives– is presented as capable of knowing 
the genuine needs of the people.
the teMporAl hoMe: Modern philosophy of history
Heller does not settle for that pre-modern dimension of home to which we 
referred earlier, that which is necessarily tied to space, but rather distinguishes 
the spatial home-experience from the temporal home-experience. On this she 
says that post-modern men, our contemporaries, are at home in a time, and not 
so much in a particular space or place. In reality, it was not even necessary 
to wait for post-modernity for this to occur. Generally speaking, modernity, 
which has been fundamentally liberal, as its enemies the reactionaries and tra-
ditionalists well know, has made it impossible for a spatial home-experience 
to exist because it tried to convert the whole world into a home. From this 
perspective, it is becoming more difficult to conceive of an “outside” or of the 
possibility of feeling like a stranger in the world. But if everything becomes a 
home the metaphor no longer has any explicative value. In other words, with-
out an outside the metaphor no longer serves to understand the human experi-
ence. The metaphor enters even further into crisis when, in an advanced stage 
of modernity, the distinction between inside and outside, interior and exterior 
is questioned (Blumenberg 1989, 665ff.).
Perhaps the best expression of the disproportionate effort to transform 
the world in our home is found in the novels of Jules Verne, which exalt the 
progress and positivist science of the nineteenth century. These novels con-
vert every place into a habitable space. Verne even manages to create a ship, 
the Nautilus, which is as safe as our home; it becomes a “perfect cubbyhole” 
while the sea voyage, the worst crime of man’s hubris for the ancients, is 
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stripped of its traditional menacing connotations (see Barthes 1973, 65-7). 
Liberal modernity –as assessed by the anti-liberal Carl Schmitt in his Land 
und Meer– no longer even fears the open space of the ocean, which is the 
most exposed, the most forlorn.
Despite this excessive and frustrated pursuit of the moderns, it is common 
knowledge that progress has not conquered our anxieties; it has not eliminated 
the outside. As long as the uncanny exists we will need a home and we will 
tend to search for or create protected spaces. Despite all that has been dis-
cussed thus far, as long as we suffer the experience of the unheimlich, which 
is almost equivalent to saying as long as man is man, the home metaphor will 
be to a certain degree productive. This presents the problem of whether we 
are prioritising evil in our ethical and political reflection (see Badiou 2001). 
From a pragmatic point of view, the starting point for our reflections is de-
cisive; it is quite different to base them on an always latent evil, rather than 
an emancipatory idea whose chief assumption is the equality of men and, 
moreover, to fight to verify this principle. Modern philosophy has certainly 
been quite optimistic and had a positive orientation, in that it believed man 
could be improved. For moderns the decisive events have been upheavals like 
the French Revolution of 1789 which were considered, beyond the victims 
that they caused –think of Kant’s writings– events that caused humanity to 
progress. However, according to the predominant philosophy of history of our 
time –if it can still be addressed as such– the fundamental event that divides 
history into a before and after is Auschwitz, the Shoah. Because the basis of 
our thinking on history is genocide, all historical-political reflections appear 
contaminated by pure evil, by evil that cannot even be represented.
In relation to the temporal question, Heller points out that the fundamental 
experience of contingency, particularly the idea of the future opened up as 
undetermined space, endangers the sensation of familiarity and transforms 
our world into an uncanny place, unheimlich again. All home-experiences are 
more or less successful attempts of coping with this uncanny lack of meaning 
derived from the contingency and indifference of the world (die Gleichgültig-
keit der Welt). In reality, like the home-experience itself, the uncertainty, the 
contingency, related with time is a constant of the human condition; and this 
is why the moderns tried with their philosophies of history –and here I as-
sume Blumenberg’s thesis– to respond to the same problems that the prior era 
resolved with theological knowledge. The moderns continued feeling com-
pelled to give meaning to the world and temporal institutions. Yet, although 
the questions were similar, the answers could not help but be different be-
cause they could no longer turn to a transcendent being.
Heller continues her reflection by stating that any home provided by a 
universal discourse is situated in time rather than in a specific place because 
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universal communication abstracts the sensual spatial experience of the par-
ticipants so that it occurs in an indifferent space. However, by focusing on 
modern political philosophy we can verify that the duality of the universal and 
the particular, of the temporal and the spatial, has not been absolute. Modern 
politics cannot be understood without the duality, today in crisis, of the state 
and civil society, which in turn is the consequence of an inseparable mixture 
of the universal and the particular. While the rational modern state supposes 
a universal that becomes a particular, given that it originally develops in a 
specific territory, civil society is composed of universalised particulars, that 
is, by of subjects whose attributes are identified with the universal rights of 
man and of the citizen.
Heller herself acknowledges that a purely temporal, universal experience 
is a difficult frontier to breach, since it demands the total abstraction of sen-
suality and emotionality. Therefore, the temporal home, so as not to become 
a prison or generate modern pathologies, requires a spatial location. Schil-
ler’s letters Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen can be explained 
within this context. These letters were written as a response to the failure of 
the French Revolution, that is, as a counterproposal to the attempt to establish 
a state in which reason was the only and absolute legislator. Aesthetic educa-
tion taught that neither the particularity of nature should be sacrificed at the 
altar of universal reason, nor should the human spirit give way to the push of 
sensibility or the sensuous drive. That is why the German affirmed that “it is 
the beautiful alone that we enjoy at the same time as individual and as species, 
i.e., as representative of the species” (“Das Schöne allein genießen wir als 
Individuum und als Gattung zugleich, d.h. als Repräsentanten der Gattung”) 
(Schiller 1875, 370). Heller has a firm grasp on the central problem of the 
temporal home. She knows that in recent times excessively universal, abstract 
modern discourses, those belonging to the grand narrative of the philosophy 
of history, have triggered their opposite, “the regression into the world of 
body health, biological fraternity, and mere corporeality” (Heller 1995, 7). Yet 
this is not a purely recent phenomenon; in fact, ever since the French Revolu-
tion there has been no shortage of discourses contrary to enlightened universal 
principles. Such cases have focused on the return to tradition, to a past located 
in a spatial home created by customs. The instability produced by modernity 
somewhat explains this reaction. During this historical period, the future de-
termined practically everything and, therefore, produced an imbalance toward 
expectations (Koselleck 1979, 369). Under these conditions, experience no 
longer plays as relevant a role as it did in the past.
Finally, the existentialist philosophies of the twentieth century emerged 
when modern philosophy of history, which had always been situated in the 
future, had already entered into an irreversible crisis. These movements view 
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man as lacking essence because his relationship with time is dominated by 
the future, something that is undefined and incapable of imprinting character. 
Once the philosophy of history and liberalism arrived at a being with no es-
sence, an alternative soon appeared which defines humanity by its origins, for 
what it has been, rather than for what it will become.
From a less anthropological perspective, thinking of man in terms of his 
origins rather than his destiny is similar to the Platonic anamnesis and even 
to biblical proto-history as a formal determination of salvation. The model of 
Western literature itself, typified by the departure and return duality that we 
find in the nostalgia of Odysseus, is yet another symptom of a being defined 
by his origins (Blumenberg 1989). Obviously, this description of humanity is 
closely tied to tradition, which has often served as a departure point that ori-
ents and gives an exact course for our existence. Furthermore, I believe that 
understanding tradition in this manner, as a spatial home which provides an 
escape from the apprehension caused by the theoretical framework of histori-
cal infiniteness, is close to Hannah Arendt’s reflection on republican founda-
tion and the concept of auctoritas (see Arendt 1961).
the hoMe of liberAl deMocrAcy And the nostAlgic reunion of 
opposites
The final home mentioned by the Hungarian philosopher is related to 
democratic institutions. As if she were a twentieth-century Tocqueville, Hel-
ler speaks about democracy in America, the most successful in her opinion, 
and indicates that the American home was founded by the Constitution. She 
adds that a democratic constitution is a home in the same measure that tradi-
tion creates a home. Similar to tradition, the Constitution can slowly change 
over time, that is, it can be amended but not abolished. If it were, Americans 
would lose their home and be uprooted.
It is true that the United States Constitution is very different than the Brit-
ish Constitution, but Heller’s observations on the founding law as a political 
tradition is very reminiscent of the work of Edmund Burke. This conserva-
tive liberal sustained that the British Constitution adopted nature’s model of 
growth, of adaptation and continuous reform. This was the basis of the fol-
lowing impression he had of his countrymen: “in what we improve we are 
never wholly new, in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete” (Burke 
2001, 184-5).
Heller’s reflections seem even closer to Hannah Arendt and to the exalta-
tion of the US Constitution, endowed with an auctoritas that in the era of the 
Roman Republic was possessed by the Senate (Arendt 1963, 200). In Rome, 
the Senate was a conservative institution because it had to maintain and even 
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enhance the political inheritance that had been transmitted from the time of 
the city’s foundation. Something similar occurred with the US Constitution, 
which founded a new tradition, and with the institutions that are in charge of 
interpreting it and transmitting it to future generations.
However, the fixation on stability, on the continuity of the legacy trans-
mitted from the foundation, on what truly converts the American democracy 
into a home, does not have to suffocate the spirit of innovation. Obviously, 
Jefferson’s revolutionary option, which sustained that each generation had 
the right to its own revolution and that the dead had no rights, was categori-
cally defeated (Jefferson 1944, 676), but that does not mean we should fall 
into the excesses of originalism defended by strict constructionists. It is not 
about sacralising the Constitution as do Berger, Rehnquist and Bork, that is, 
interpreting it according to original intent and opposing its adaptation to the 
changes experienced by society (Beltrán 1989, 57). With this in mind, we can 
understand Heller when she quotes Michelman’s declaration that American 
democracy has to be regained every day. Its habitat is experience, the space 
where political affairs take place, and not abstract or universal principles that, 
as discussed, are linked to modernity’s temporal home-experience. This ex-
plains why American democracy never needed a grand narrative, a philoso-
phy of history.
Heller adds that in America consent is valued more highly than dissent, 
“just as prior to the development of modernity” (Heller 1995, 13). But al-
though the republican tradition is tied to consent, I feel that we cannot simply 
dismiss the benefits of dissent, of disputability or even emancipatory con-
flicts. This is Philip Pettit’s stance, a neo-republican who over the last few 
years has insisted that conflict plays a positive role within institutions. Pettit 
sustains, in contrast to Hannah Arendt and what he refers to as the populist 
tradition, that political liberty requires not so much consent but rather disput-
ability or dissent. That is to say, democratic self-government depends on the 
possibility that decisions made by the government or any other representative 
can be disputed by the people. Thus neo-republicanism is linked to the pos-
sibility of altering political decisions as a consequence of a public dispute. 
Pettit refers to a conflict that takes place within institutional channels and 
between actors that acknowledge each other (see Pettit 1997), but a dispute 
carried out as described by Jacques Rancière in his work La mésentente could 
also be democratic (see Rancière 1995); a dispute that at its core is a reconsid-
eration of the class struggle. I am referring specifically to all those conflicts 
carried out by a group that is not acknowledged by the institutions or by other 
subjects to be equal to other parts of the community.
Finally, Heller indicates that democracy in general or in the abstract is not 
a home, but one or another democracy could be if, as occurs in America, their 
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citizens –the founding fathers and mothers of the present– re-found it every 
day; or, to state it in the terms used by Arendt, if they increase or broaden the 
democratic legacy they inherit. Heller adds that “if there is such a home, it is 
spatial, for you cannot carry it on your back, and also temporal, insofar as it 
lives in the absolute present” (Heller 1995, 14). Our philosophy recognises 
that the democratic home does not guarantee the end of anti-democratic or 
even totalitarian mental attitudes. In the American democracy itself there are 
communities and pressure groups that construct anti-universalistic and exclu-
sive homes. Heller finds the antidote for this intolerance in liberalism, which 
is not a home of course, but rather a principle, a conviction and an attitude 
which brings tolerance or respect for the plurality of lifestyles to our home. 
From this perspective, democracy must be liberal so that the home does not 
become a prison or a tyranny.
However, Heller herself knows that European liberalism was incapable 
of avoiding modern tyrannies, the totalitarianism of the twentieth century. 
The liberal city was not only the tolerant city, but also, as explained by the 
philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel, a habitat that paradoxically gen-
erated new closed and secret spaces. Instead of being a common refuge, in 
some European states it became a home where closed individual spaces, im-
penetrable for the other, proliferated. Although the modern big city was no 
longer surrounded by walls or protected by a locked gate, it continued to be 
armed against anything that it did not produce or recognise as reality. Noise, 
for example, shut every citizen up in his cave, in his room, and made public 
or social relations more difficult in the modern city. This gives the impression 
–so powerful in Kafka’s novels– of being surrounded everywhere by closed 
doors (Simmel 1968, 486; Blumenberg 1989, 80-1).
Heller sustains that the introduction of liberalism in the discourse of de-
mocracy did not leave our world unscathed. This is true to such an extent 
that she has to reformulate her initial question, “where are we at home”, and 
instead ask “where are you at home” or, even better, “where is each individual 
at home”, because in her opinion it would be nearly impossible for two people 
to give exactly the same answer. In effect, liberal principles allow each per-
son to answer the question in her own way: homes are built from subjective 
preference and this makes it possible to avoid the dangers of fundamentalism. 
If this is the case, we must acknowledge that liberalism has transformed the 
home metaphor into the opposite of what it originally signified; instead of 
being primarily a shared space, it is now a space that is freely chosen as one’s 
own. If this is true, perhaps it makes no sense to use the metaphor to think 
about politics, to think about the space shared by many or perhaps everyone.
Heller acknowledges of course that homes are not made for solitary be-
ings; that these places are shared and require some assimilation because with-
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in them one must be accepted, welcome, or at least tolerated. Our liberal 
principles, however, ensure that assimilation does not become tyranny. But 
declaring a liberal democracy as our home gives rise to a suspicion that per-
haps what we are really trying to do is solve the massive unresolvable prob-
lem of modern politics: how to unite opposites or bring harmony to politics 
and plurality. Heller’s final answer to “where are we at home?” is “each of us 
is in the world of our self-appointed and shared destiny” (Heller 1995, 18); 
although this answer reveals perhaps a greater fear of totalitarian patholo-
gies derived from excessive unity than of nihilistic pathologies derived from 
excessive pluralism, it is surely based on a profound need to reconcile the in-
dividual and the collective. The fact that she converts liberal democracy into 
a home doubtlessly alludes to this profound nostalgic desire to harmonise the 
incompatible and to overcome the hostility inherent between different ways 
of understanding life. And I believe that no concept is capable of expressing it 
as well as the absolute metaphor of the home.
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